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REFRESHING RECOLLECTION
There are two totally distinct phenomena, which, in dealing
with human testimony, it is necessary to discriminate. A man
may have had at some time in the past a perception of an event,
and while the memory of it still existed, may have reduced his
apprehension of it to writing, or have communicated it, by vocal
or other non-written signs, to others. He may when evidence of
this event is desired in a court of justice be and remain unable to
recall it. The tribunal will then be put in the dilemma of being
compelled either to dispense altogether with evidence derived
from this person or to receive his past declarations concerning it.
A man may have observed a past phenomenon, e. g., a con-
versation, a series of acts, such as a murder, or arson. When,
however, he is called as a witness, he finds himself unable alto-
gether, or in part, to remember. The memory is capable often
of being revived. Impressions of a past occurrence have passed
out of consciousness;' but they may be made to re-enter con-
sciousness by various suggestions. A visual, tactile, auditory or
olfactory sensation may revive the latent scene. The name
of a person refuses to reappear. Some one asks him, is it
Harper? No. Is it Jones? No. Is it John Hamilton? Instantly
the memory is evoked from unconsciousness. The response,
yes, is instantaneous. In this case the revival has occurred, not
through an assertion, but through an interrogation.
If merely interrogative remarks awaken a clear and positive
recollection, assertive remarks may no less readily do so. Had
the interlocutor instead of saying "was it John Hamilton ?" said
"it was John Hamilton," the revivication would have also oc-
curred. It is even possible for an assertive declaration to awaken
a memory contradictory of or otherwise inconsistent with the dec-
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laration. Had the interlocutor said, "The man you saw was not
John Hamilton," the person addressed would possibly have in-
stantly replied, "That is the man. It was John Hamilton."
Things linked with the past sensation or perception by the rela-
tion of contiguity in time or space, by resemblance or contrast
may suggestively awaken the memory of that sensation .or per-
ception. These facts concerning the revivification of the memory
present a second problem to the court. When a witness finds
himself oblivious of a fact which he has once probably known,
may any or all of the instruments known to have the power to
reawaken latent memory be employed to awaken his memory?
If they may, and if the witness's memory is revived, we have not
a past memory of a past event expressed through- a memorial or
history, which it created in the past, and which is now produced,
but a present memory of the past event, which, it is true, was
latent a moment ago [as, indeed, all memories are latent for most
of the time between the perceptibn of the event and the present],
and which is embodying itself in a memorial or history now to be
created. One would have supposed that two phenomena so pal-
pably different would not have escaped the discrimination of even
ordinarily perspicacious minds. Yet distinction between them
has escaped a great number of courts. A clear discrimination
between them remains yet to be made in Pennsylvania. "In
Pennsylvania," says Wigmore,1 "it is difficult to say whether
there is in this jurisdiction a definite and settled acceptance of
past recollection as distinguished from present recollection."
Although at one time the use of a past recollection embodied in
a memorandum or written narrative is allowed, the process is
usually described as a refreshing of the recollection, which, or the
like of which, it palpably is not.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN REFRESHING RECOLLEC-
TION AND A PAST RECORD
In a dissenting opinion Gibson, J., indicates the distinction be-
tween refreshing the memory and using a past writing as sub-
stantive evidence. "Where," says the Justice, "for the purpose
of perpetuating the evidence of a fact [it cannot matter what the
'1 Evid., p. 831.
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purpose is], a witness has made a written statement of it at the
time [it would not need to be at the time, if the witness's memory
was 9till fresh], and can recollect nothing further than that he
had accurately reduced the whole transaction to writing, ought
not the written statement, thus authenticated by his oath, to be
admitted as evidence, and would not the mind of a juror rest more
confidently on its truth than on the frail recollection of man."'
Twenty-two years later, in 1846, the same justice denies that the
law prefers memory to writing for the preservation of evidence,
or that a memorandum which fails to move the memory [i. e., to
revive it] of him who made it, cannot be introduced as inde-
pendent proof, preceded by his oath of its accuracy when taken.'
PROPRI TY OF REFRESHING THE MEMORY
The sweeping observation was once made by Woodward, J.,"
that "It is always competent for a witness to refresh his memory
by memoranda made at the time of the transaction of which he
speaks." It may be conceded that it is difficult to define the
cases in which such refreshment would not be allowed. B testi-
fied that he agreed to pay $5o a year for the use of an alley. It
was alleged that the agreement was written, and that the writing
was the best evidence. The court nevertheless received the evi-
dence without the writing. Justifying this act, Agnew, J., re-
marks that the writing would be but a certificate of the fact not
on oath. If the writing were the best evidence of the fact to be
proved by it [a bond, a deed, a will, a letter?! !], it would open
'Smith v. Lane, 12 ,S. & R. 80. The real question is between a
recollection a short time after the event [when the memorandum is
written] and a longer time after the event when the testimony in court
is to be delivered. The space between these two events may be so
short that the memory at the earlier time has no appreciably greater
reliability than at the later time. On the other hand, the distance may
be so great as to warrant the belief that the memory at the end of it is
less reliable than at the beginning.
2Hart v. Hummel, 3 Pa. 414. The observation of Thomlson, J., in
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schreffler, 44 Pa. 269, that "care should be taken that
the recollection alone of the witness thus refreshed shotld constitute
the testimony and not the paper" is inept. It is quite possible that the
paper should be known to be an accurate narrative, and, also, that its
re-perusal should have awakened the memory of the writer.
'Selover v. Rexfordrs Exec., 52 Pa. 308.
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the door to the fraudulent concoction of evideice, enabling men
to prove by a written statement what they dare not say upon
oath. He concedes that the writing might be called for to
"refresh" the witness's memory.' The question being whether
B was in A's employ between certain dates, it is relevant to show
that he was in the employ of C between those dates. C, testifying
that B was in his employ, but unable to say exactly when or how
long, might look at his book in which he kept an account of pay-
ments made to B for labor, and might then say that he believes
that B worked for him between the fore part of November, 1855
,
and February, 1856.2 In order to ascertain whether A bought
goods from B on a certain date, B is permitted to refer to his
book, if the charge is in his own handwriting, and, his memory
being thus refreshed, to say what goods were sold to A.' A wit-
ness having made entries into memorandum books of payments of
moneys to X in order that X might purchase articles for him,
and the next or the same day, having transcribed them into a
ledger, may in testifying employ the ledger in order to refresh
his memory. 4 In order to refresh his memory a witness may re-
fer to freight books kept by him or verified by him at the time of
making, and to check slips made in the ordinary course of busi-
ness, in transshipping goods from one car to another, in proof of
the number of the cars and of the distinctive marks of the goods.
Hence a memorandum made by another person, but, at the time
of making, examined by the witness and thus found by him to
be correct may be used to fix the number of cars at a certain
place and time.' A car is weighed on its arrival at a certain
point. Two months afterwards the weighmaster of the railroad
'Gilmore v. Wilson, 53 Pa. 194. The justice's observations seem
wholly irrelevant to the facts.
'Dodge v. Bache, 57 Pa. 421.
3Shannon v. Castner, 21 Super. 294. The error of refusing to allow
a witness to refresh his memory was obliterated by allowing him later
to do so. Powell v. Ins. Co., 2 Super. 151.
4Flhrhartv. Katzen, 25 Lanc. 358. Hassler, J., quotes from 1 Wharton,
Evid., 2d Edit. §516. A witness who makes or is concerned in making
written notes of an event, near the time of its occurrence, is permitted to
refer in the examination to such notes in order to refresh his memory.
Gibson's opinion in 12 S. & R. 80 is also cited.
5Huckenstein v. Jolly, 2 Lanc. 164.
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company makes an affidavit as to the weight of the car, but he
makes it from data in the office and he does not say that he knows
the accuracy of these data. Called as a witness he cannot use
the affidavit to refresh his memory. He might have used it for
that purpose had he known the truth of these data and had the
affidavit embodied them.1 A has a conversation with B, who is
now the defendant in a criminal prosecution. Immediately
thereafter A makes a memorandum of the conversation. He may
as a witness use the memorandum in order to refresh his memory.'
The question is whether Martin was a partner with McCoy. A
book of original entries of a firm, Cook & Cresson, who dealt
with McCoy & Co., described those with whom a transaction was,
as McCoy and Martin, trading under the firm name of McCoy & Co.
Cook, of the firm of Cook & Cresson, was called as a witness to
provethat Martin was of the firm of McCoy & Co. "Certainly,"
says Tilghman, C. J., "he might have refreshed his memory and
then sworn with a memory tefreshed. '"3
COMPELLING A MAN TO REFRESH HIS MEMORY
In a suit against a railroad company, three rules for the tak-
ing of depositions in advance of the trial were entered. One was
to compel L. to examine his books so as to refresh his memory
and to qualify himself to testify upon his examination. The
court refused to make the order: this matter should be regulated
by a judge at the trial and not in advance of it before a commis-
sioner [to take depositions]. "Besides," says Arnold, P. J., "it
is doubtful whether a witness can be compelled to produce his
books and papers anywhere except at a trial before a judge or
referee or master who is hearing a case in lieu of a trial in court."
L. had already been examined before the commissioner. Exam-
ination on his books was deferred until the trial.'
1Samuel v. Pa. R. R. Co., 45 Super. 395.
2Com. v. Klein, 42 Super. 66.
3Juniata Bank of Penna. v. Brown, 5 S. & R. 226.
%Iadenburg v. Penna. R. R. Co., 6 Dist. 453. The question being
whether A was at place m or at place n on a certain day. X testified
that A brought his horse to X's shop at n on that day. While testify-
ing X had his day books before him. In a subsequent trial, a witness
could testify to what X said, he being now dead, although the book was
not produced. Cox v. Norton, 1 P. & W. 412.
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NUMEROUS ITEMS. PAST RECOLLECTION
Sometimes the use of a past knowledge expressed in a memo-
randum, entries in a book, etc., is justified because of the number
of the objects or facts to be ascertained, and the unlikelihood that
a witness could recollect them at all, or recollect them without
assistance. The question was, whether the sheriff, the defendant,
sued for selling on execution against X, the property of A, the
plaintiff, had sold certain things. The witness was shown a paper
and asked to state whether the things mentioned in it had been
sold by the sheriff. The paper was not put in evidence. The wit-
ness having inspected it, he swore that the sheriffsold these articles.
Says Tilghman, C. J., "If evidence of this kind is rejected, it will
be impossible to prove the sale of a nunber of articles. No man's
memory can retain such things, and therefore it has always been
judged proper that the witness should be permitted to refresh his
recollection in the manner here permitted." It is uncertain
whether the witness professed, after i~specting the pper, to have
a memory of the sale of the things or simply that the paper cor-
rectly embodied what, when he had originally seen it, he knew to
be a correct enumeration of the things sold.' A statement of things
lost in a fire, made out by an insured person and his son, was
properly admitted in evidence. They swore that they made it out
from their own knowledge of the facts, but that they consulted in-
voices and other papers to assist them in remembering the articles
and prices. This did not give to the statement the character of a
copy and of secondary evidence. One may know that he had in
his possession articles named in certain invoices, and that these
were burnt, and yet be unable to remember the items without the
invoice to refresh the memory. "In all cases where accounts are
multitudinous, the rule as to perional knowledge of the witness is
relaxed. He must be permitted to put the items into an account
and to refresh his recollectioni by means of other accounts and
papers as to items. * * * * In an account of sales, consist-
ing of numerous items, the party rarely recollects all the items,
but he can be perfectly certain from his mode of business on find-
ing the entries in his books, that the charges were correctly
'Babb v. Clemson, 12 S. & R. 328. Several articles had been'sold in
Striker v. McMiclhael, 1 Phila. 89.
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made.1 An action for the price of ochre sold and delivered. A has
hauled for R, the plaintiff, ochre to a certain factory from the mine.
When paid for the hatuling he has given receipts to R. As a witness
for R, he may look at these receipts and then say -that he hauled
ochre to a certain quantity and deposited it at the place designated
by the defendant, the purchaser of the ochre. "He uses the receipts,"
says Clark, J.,"to refresh his recollection." They are read " simply
as a statement prepared by the witness, fixing the several quantities
delivered at the dates designated respectively."' Work done
from day to day over a considerable period. One who has kept
an account, may use it while testifying. He maybe told to refresh
his memory with the papers and books and to work his way along
his list, i. e., to read from the accounts.' A fire destroyed a large
quantity of goods in a store. In order, in a suit upon the policy
of insurance, to ascertain the value of the goods destroyed, use was
made of an inventory, made a year before. The secretary of the
plaintiff company, with others, when the inventory was being made
out, verified the figures and was satisfied that they were correct.
He positively testified that the goods mentioned in the inventory
were in the factory. "Certainly while testifying," says Thompson,
J., "he would have been warranted in refreshing his memory by a
reference to the inventory made up under his supervision and by
his direction, as to the hccuracy of which there was not the slightest
question, and so demonstrated upon cross-examination.""
1Alleghany Ins. Co. v. Hanlon, 31 Leg. Int. 372. But, when a witness
infers the accuracy of his memorandum, not from a present memory of
the facts mentioned in it, but from his mode of doing business, he is not
remembering the specific transactions or facts. His memory has not
been refreshed.
2Long v. Regen, 119 Pa. 403. There was probably here no refresh-
ing of the memory, but an inference from the receipts that the baulings
mentioned in them occurred.
3Mead v. White, 6 Sadler 138. Probably no real refreshing of the
memory as to most of the daily work.
'Wells Mfg. Co. v. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 209 Pa. 488. The objection
was groundless that the men who actually counted and weighed the
articles were not called as witnesses because the inventory was made
under the direction ot the secretary and was duly verified by him. But
the verification was the assertion of the men who did the counting and
weighing. The inventory embodied their oral reports to the secretary.
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PROOF OF CORRECTNESS OF MEMORIAL
A record of a past event cannot be used to prove the event,
unless its own accuracy is established. The witness may remem-
ber his execution of the record, and his intention to make it ac-
curate, and his then power to make it accurate. He may be con-
vinced, seeing that his name is to a document, e. g., as a sub-
scribing witness, that he put it there and that he would not have
done so had he not seen the execution of the document.'
"Where a party making the entry is living and competent to tes-
tify, it is necessary," says Henderson, J., "to produce him.
Where he is dead, or when called as a witness has no recollec-
tion of the facts, but testifies that it was his practice to make all
his entries truthfully at the time, and that he believes the entry
to be accurate, it is considered as original and not hearsay evi-
dence to establish the fact in question." 2  A writing, offered as
proof of a fact asserted in it, is only a certificate of the writer, not
on oath. He must be called to prove the fact averred in it, or to
prove the past correspondence of it with the fact. Says Agnew,
J., a party who agrees to pay $50 for the use of an alley may
prove that fact, although it is alleged that the agreement is in
writing. The writing is not the best evidence of the fact. (1) The
person who makes the agreement may testify to it. The writing
may be called for to refresh his memory, or by the opposite party
to contradict him.3 A settlement between A and B was made in
the presence of C. At the trial C had no recollection of what
was said by them, but he put down on the paper, by direction of
A and B, that one of them, the obligor, in a bond payable to the
other, admitted that the bond was unpaid. The paper was prop-
erly received in evidence.'
PUTTING IN EVIDENCE THE MEMORIAL OF A
PAST KNOWLEDGE
When there is a memorandum or record of an event which is
sworn to be accurate by one who knows its accuracy, it must, of
course, in order to be of use, be put in evidence. A deposit made
'Piggott v. Holloway, 1 Binn. 436.
2 Com. v. Berney, 28 Super. 61.
3 Gilmore v. Wilson, 53 Pa. 194.
'4 by v. Eby's Assignee, 5 Pa. 435.
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in bank is entered in a book of the bank. The clerk who makes
it swears to its accuracy. He has no present recollection of the
transaction, even after examining the book. The book entry is
thus made receivable.' Assumsit for work done. A witness for
the plaintiff, his apprentice, stated that he kept an account of the
work done; entries were made in the book on the last day of each
week, or if only one day in the week, at the end of that day; that
is, he testified to the accuracy of the entries in the book. The
book was then receivable in addition to the testimony of the wit-
ness, whose recollection, invigorated by the witness, had enabled
him to swear to the facts stated in them. But, had the witness
been unable to testify to the facts, the book would have been
receivable. "It is fallacious to suppose," says Gibson, C. J.,
"that the law prefers memory to writing for the preservation of
evidence or that a fiiemorandum which fails to move the memory
of him who made it cannot be introduced as independent proof,
preceded by his oath, of its accuracy when it was written."'
A claims for the erection of a stone crusher. One of his employ-
es kept the time of the men. Each day he noted down the num-
ber of hours each carpenter worked. After he swore that the
book was correctly kept the court admitted it in evidence, not as
a book of original entries, but as a memorandum whose accuracy
was sufficiently certified.' A report made by a conductor of a
street railway car shortly after an accident to a passenger, giving
the names of witnesses of the occurrence, their addresses and oc-
cupations, and other circumstances, could be used by him to re-
fresh his memory, as to the time when the event occurred, the
names of the witnesses, etc., more than 2yz years having elapsed
since the date of the accident." A minute made by C, at the in-
'F. & M. Bank v. Boraef, 1 R. 152. The entry showed a deposit of
$80. The entry in the depositor's pass-book showed a deposit of $800.
'Hart v. Hummel, 3 Pa. 414. Cf. Smith v. Lane, 12 S. & R. 80, where
a book, not of original entries, was thought by Gibson, J.., in a dissent-
ing opinion, to be receivable, to prove the deliveries of wheat mentioned
in it, on dependable evidence of its accuracy, without the testimony of
a witness who professed that his memory had been refreshed by it.
'Heavener v. Tilli, 19 Montg. 13.
'Clark v. Union-Traction Co., 210 Pa. 636. The court speaks of
using the report to refresh the memory. It is evident that his memory
was not to be refreshed and that the report was to be really used as sub-
stantive evidence, supported by testimony as to its correctness. After
231 years the conductor would not have remembered faces, names or
date, even after an inspection of the report.
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stance of A and B, of an agreement between them was put in
evidence after C had given an account of its writing.'
PUTTING MEMORANDUM IN EVIDENCE
When a memorandum is used, because it embodies a past
knowledge of the transaction, and not as an instrument for affect-
ing the mind of the witness while he is on the stand, it is a part
of the evidence that must be considered by the jury. The witness
says it is true. Its contents must then be made known, either by
an inspection by the jurors, or by the audible reading of it by
some one.' When the memorandum is used simply like any other
suggestion to awaken the dormant memory of the witness, who
will then testify directly to the facts because he recollects
them, and not on the authority of the paper, the party who called
the witness and caused him to aid his memqry, has no right to
read the paper, or to submit it to the inspection of the jury.*
Such is the scientific view.
NOT PUT IN EVIDENCE
A paper used merely to refresh the memory "is not evi-
dence," says Tilghman, C. J., meaning, doubtless, that it is not
to be submitted to the jury by the party who elicits the testimony
of the witness.' A memorandum of a conversation, though used
to refresh the memory, was, apparently, not put in evidence.'
Plaintiff claiming for money advanced to B, defendant, in order
that B might make purchases of articles for him, keeps an ac-
count of the advances and of deliveries of goods purchased in
little memorandum books. Some of these books were lost, but the
items in them had been copied by the plaintiff into a ledger on
the same or the next day. The plaintiff was allowed to refresh
his recollection by referring to the ledger. He did not put the
IF by v. Eby's Assignee, 5 Pa. 435.
21 Wigmore, Fvid. p. 848.
81 Wigmore, 4vid. p. 856.
'Babb v. Clemson, 16 S. & R. 328.
5Edwards v. Gimbel, 202 Pa. 30. In Juniata Bank v. Brown, 5 S. &
R. 226, Tilghman, C. J., says that a witness might use his book of entries
to refresh his memory, and then with memory refreshed, might swear
to the fact, "but he had no right to introduce into his deposition the
matter which he had made use of to refresh his memory."
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ledger in evidence. It was, however, put in evidence by the de-
fendant.' It is always competent for a witness to refresh his
memory by memoranda made at the time of the transaction of
which he speaks, and where the memorandum has been received
in evidence without objection, and it recites the substance of the
very transaction testified to, it is not error for the court to say
that it "corroborates the witness." '2  A sues B for the price of
electric light fixtures and of inserting them, etc. He puts in evi-
dence a book purporting to be a book of original entries. Having
admitted it, the court subsequently told the jury that it could not
be considered as such a book. It contained lump charges; it
showed the dealings of the plaintiff with the defendant only. The
entries in it were not made contemporaneously with the doing of
the work. The court said that the witness for the plaintiff could
testify to anything that he recalled to have been furnished to the
defendant, and that he might use the book as a means of refresh-
ing his memory, if he knew it to be correct. The evidence of the
witness showed that he had not depended solely upon the book.
No injustice was done to the plaintiff by the court's saying that
the book was not one of original entries. If a mistake wasmade in
receiving the book, it was by the fault of the plaintiff who offered it.
He cannot complain of the receiving of it.'
PUT IN EVIDENCE
In some cases the memorandum book, etc., that has been
used by witness to refresh his memory has been put in evidence
by the party for whom the witness, after the assisting of his mem-
ory, hastestified. The reason is not always discernible. A bill
of sale was put in the hands of plaintiff's witness. He compared
the goods mentioned in it with goods in the plaintiff's possession.
It bad certain marks, put there by the witness. The judge ad-
'Ehrhart v. Katzen, 25 Lauc. 358. The defendant, therefore, could
not object to the ledger being in evidence.
2Selover v. Rexford's Exec., 52 Pa. 308. The memorandum of an
agreement drawn up by a witness and signed by him at the instance of
the parties to the agreement, was possibly used by this witness to re-
fresh his memory. It was also put in evidence without objection
and the court said to the jury that it corroborates the recollection of the
witness in regard to the date and the terms of the arrangement.
'McKnight v. Newell, 207 Pa. 562.
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mitted the bill of sale in evidence, with a printed catalogue of
goods, on which the plaintiff had marked the goods as his. "The
marks," says Sharswood, J., "were not evidence, and could not
have been supposed to have influenced the jury further than it
was sustained by the evidence," thus tacitly conceding that the
admission of the bill of sale was not improper.' An account of
an assignee, used to refresh his memory as to the less worth of
articles mentioned in the inventory, than that stated therein, was
put in evidence.2 In a suit by A's executor for barrels.in which
ale had been sold by A to B, with a promise by B to return the
barrels, A's book-keeper produced a book, testifying that he had
made the entries in it on the days of the respective sales, etc. The
book was then put in evidence. Approving, the supreme court
said, puzzlingly: "This case went to the jury upon facts proved
by witness, independently of the books of original entries. [How
so? The book was in, evidence.] The book itself was proved
by a witness and the entries in it sustained aliande. [What does this
mean? That the sales of ale, or that the entries were proved
aliunde.] As the case stood, the book was used rather as a
memorandum of charges and a bill of particulars to ascertain the
items of the amount." '  Assumpsit on a stock subscription. A
written notice, not in the handwriting of the witness, who was
the secretary of the corporation, but which, as he believed, had
been written by his order by a clerk, and which he had signed,
was put in the hands of the witness, and he was asked whether
his memory was refreshed as to the form of notice he had given
to the defendant to pay the call. He answered that the resolution
recited in this notice was an exact copy of the resolution of the
directors making the call, and that he "should say it was a copy
of the notices that were sent to all the stockholders." He had
no reason to believe that any other form of notice was sent. The
written notice was then offered and received in evidence.' A's
'Striker v. McMichael, I Phila. 89.
2 Conn v. Hazlett, 14 Super. 352. Yet the value of the account am
"independent evidence" of values was denied.
3Henry v. Martin, 1 W. N. 277.
4Car & Coach Co. v. Zlebree, 19 Super. 618. This is called "refresh-
ing recollection." There was no refreshing of recollection. There
was simply inference that the notices sent corresponded with the
notice in the witness's hands.
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note, payable to B, was discounted for B at a bank. A alleging
that the note was made for B's accommodation, and that he had
paid it, sues B to recover the money paid. The note was lost.
Payment was proved by the testimony of A, and of the bank
officers, and by reference to the bank's books, which showed sev-
eral renewals of the note and the payment of the last one by A's
check. The pass-books of both parties were also put in evidence.
Apparently, the bank's books were put in evidence. Witnesses
were called, who made the entries in the bank books, to prove
them, and that such a note passed through the books and was re-
newed from time to time. The books were admissible to refresh
the memories of the witnesses, and to supply missing dates,
amounts, etc., and make certain what the want of memory would
not supply. It was not a case of original and substantive evi-
dence furnished by the books alone.'
READING THE PAPER
To read the paper to the jury would be a way of making it
evidence. A witness was directed by the court to look at his
papers and books beginning at the first charge against the defend-
ant and working his way up to the last; doing so, he announced
what he read to the jury, yet he was told to "refresh your
memory." 2  In a suit against an insurance company the plaintiff
was obliged to prove what things in a store had been destroyed
by fire. The witness used the "particular statement" to refresh
his memory. "Such items as he could recollect as being in the
store and [as were?] in the statement, he was permitted to identify
'Bollman v. Smith, 34 Leg. Int. 447. In Vulcanite Paving Co. v.
Ruch, 147 Pa. 251, plaintiff had paved a street to the width of six feet
at the instance of the defendant. A witness testified to measurements
made by him as to the space to be paved. He said he made the mem-
orandum at the time he did the measuring. The book was put in evi-
dence. For what purpose does not appear. Even if erroneous, says
the supreme court, the admission is not ground for reversal, because,
under the circumstances, it could have done no harm to the defendant.
2Mead v. White, 6 Sadler 38. Perhaps the books were used as a
veridical history of the past transactions, on the witness's assertion of
their accuracy. It is not believable that the witness was meant simply
silently to scan the items and as often as any of them awakened a
memory of the facts, to affirm them on the responsibility of a present
memory.
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and read from the statement." "This was 'not wrong," says
Thompson, J., "but care should be taken that the recollection
alone of the witness thus refreshed should constitute the testimony
and not the paper." 1 Jones, called to prove the value of property
sold by sheriff, estimated it at $20,0o0. He was allowed to read
to the jury a bill of items of the values of articles sold by the
sheriff. Says Agnew, J., "The court only suffered him to state
in detail what before he had stated in the aggregate, thus making
his valuation more open to attack if unsound and more satisfactory
if reliable." But reading to the jury the bill was virtually putting
it in evidence. Yet it is treated as simply a means of assisting
the memory. 2 The sheriff has taken in execution as B's, goods
claimed by A, the plaintiff, who sues him. The goods had be-
longed to A, who alleged that he had only conditionally sold
them to B, and that the condition had not been fulfilled. C, a
witness and former clerk of A, proved by deposition the sale and
its terms, and what part of the goods sold was taken by the
sheriff. He also proved that a certain book produced before him,
the "order book," was that in which the plaintiff and his clerks
were in the habit of entering such books as 'vere from time to
time ordered from him. This book was produced, and plaintift
offered to read the entries therein made by the witness, as clerk,
relative to the sale of the goods in question to B. The book was
allowed to be read. Says the supreme court; "The book was not
receivable as a book original entries. The entries were offered
to identify the subject of the sale, not the value. "They were
embodied in the testimony of a witness who made them, and ver-
ified them, as memoranda to designate the goods selected; and
who testified that the ticks and marks placed opposite to the items
were used to distinguish the casks or packages delivered to the
drayman. The witness did not, as is usual in regard to book
entries, authenticate the book, and allow it to speak for itself; he
testified to the particulars of the transaction from his own knowl-
edge, and thus corroborated, the entries were clearly admissible.
1Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schreffler, 44 Pa. 269. But if the.paper is read to
the jury, how is it to be known that it is not received by the jury as a
part of the evidence?2King v. Faber, 51 Pa. 387.
3Fitler v. Eyre, 14 Pa. 392. Apparently the witness had not de-
pended on the book for refreshing his memory. He had testified inde-
pendently of them. The books corroborated his evidence as his evi-
dence corroborated the books.
[CONCLUDED IN NEXT ISSUE.]
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MOOT COURT
COMMONWEALTH v. BEAL
Burglary-What Constitutes a Breaking-Contributory Negligence
STATE ENT OF FACTS
Indictment for burglary.-Williston retired, leaving the window of
his bedroom raised about two inches. Beal, the defendant, with intent
to steal Williston's watch, raised the window further and entered the
room at 12:30 A. M.
Rorer for Plaintiff.
Means for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
FERRIO, J.-This case presents the interesting question whether
the raising of a window which is partially opened is such a breaking as is
required under our statute. Breaking may be of two kinds, actual and
constructive. A constructive breaking is one obtained by fraud or ar-
tifice. It is plainly seen that the defendant's breaking does not come
under that head. To constitute actual breaking there must be some
actual force used to make an opening. It is true that some force was
used in putting up the window, but the window was partially opened
and the law does not recognize this as a breaking.
It has been held in this state in Comm. v; Rolland, 85 Pa. 66, by
Judge Paxton, "that if a person leaves his doors or windows open it is
his own folly and negligence, and if a thief enters therein there is no
burglary."
In Comm. v. Strupney, 105 Mass. 588, a case bearing a close resem-
blance to this one, it was held that before one can be convicted
of burglary, there must be evidence that all external openings were
closed. This view is also taken in People v. McCord, 76 Mich. 200. It
is plainly shown here that the window was partially opened.
Dr. Trickett, in his work on Criminal Law of Pennsylvania, says
that an entry into a house at night through an open door or window
would involve no breaking, vol. 1, page 147. If a person leaves his
doors open or partly opened or his window raised or partly raised or un-
fastened, it will be such negligence on his p rt as is calculated to in-
duce or tempt a stranger to enter, and if he does so through the open
door or window as by pushing open the partly closed door or window,
it will not be burglary, 6 Cyc. 174; 262 Clark's Criminal Law; Comm. v.
Strupney, 105 Mass., 588; Timmons v. State, 34 Ohio 426.
The English Courts take the same view as most of our courts which
view is stated above. In 7 C and P 441, Rex v. Hyams, it was held to
be no breaking if prisoners threw up the sash of a window which had
already been raised a couple of inches and so effected an entry.
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In Comm. v. Stephenson, 8 Pickering 354, the court held that it
should appear that the house was secured in the ordinary way, so that
by the carelessness of the owner in leaving the door or window open
the party accused of burglary be not tempted to enter. In Comm. v.
Strupney, supra, the court held that an entrance into a dwelling through
a window or door which has been left partly open is not the forcible en-
tering and breaking necessary to constitute burglary.
Therefore, in view of cases cited it is plainly seen that the defend-
ant did no breaking which is one of the essentials of the crime, and,
therefore, cannot be held for the crime.
Verdict for defendant.
OPINION OF SUPF4RIOR COURT
The question presented by this case was first decided in Massa-
chusetts in 1789. In Comm. v. Steward, 7 Dane Abr. 136, it was held
that "if a window be a little pushed up * * * so that one passing
may see that the owner has not properly shut his house, it is no burg-
larious breaking to enter tho a further pushing up of the window be
necessary." A similar decision was reached in C. v. Hays, 7 Dane Abr.
136, and these early cases were followed in C. v. Strupney, 105 Mass
588. The same doctrine was enunciated in Rex v. Smith, 1 Moody 178,
S. v. Long, 5 Ohio Dec. 617, Rose v. C, 19 Ky. L. Rqp. 272.
The doctrine announced by these cases was somewhat modified, tho
not entirely repudiated, in P. v. Dupree, 98 Mich. 26. In this case it
appeared that the accused on the day preceding the night of the break-
ing raised the window slightly so that it could not be fastened by the
bolt. At night he raised the window so as to effect an entrance. This
was held to be a breaking. The court distinguished the case from
the others on the ground that the window "was raised so little as not to
attract the notice of the occupant."
Recent cases, however, repudiate entirely the doctrine laid down in
the Massachusetts cases. In Claiborne v. S., 113 Tenn. 261, 68 L. R. A.
859; P. v. White, 153 Mich. 617, and Murmutt v. S., (Texas) 67 S. W.
508 it is held that to raise sufficiently to gain an entrance a partly open
window constitutes a burglarious breaking.
This, it is submitted, is the correct view. Contributory negligence
is not a defense to a criminal prosecution. One may be convicted of
false pretences, tho the party from whom the property was obtained was
negligent in relying upon the pretences; one may be convicted of in-
voluntary manslaughter, tho the deceased was guilty of contributory
negligence; one may be convicted of larceny, tho the property was neg-
ligently exposed. No good reason is discovered why a different rule
should be applied to burglary.
The tendency of the courts of late has been to hold that but the
slightest force is necessary to constitute a breaking and it would be a
useless refinement to hold that the further raising of a window partly
open is not a breaking.
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THOMPSON v. YOUNG
Essentials of Tort Liability-Proximate Cause-Death of
Horse by Intentional Fright-Aviator
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Young, an aviator, while manoeuvering over the land of Thompson
intentionally flew three feet above a horse which was being driven by
Thompson. The horse seeing the machine neighed loudly, leaped into
the air and fell dead. Reputable veterinarians testified that the death
of the horse was due to fright caused by the sight of the flying machine,
and there was no evidence to the contrary.
Price for Plaintiff.
Reese for Defendant.
OPINION OF TH4 COURT
ROWLEY, J.-The question involved here is whether the rule
largely followed, that individuals cannot recover damages for nervous
shock and mental suffering, should be applied to horses.
In this case the plaintiff seeks to recover on the ground of wilful
negligence, which, we think is not the proper ground of recovery, but
that of trespass which was committed by Young, the aviator, in sailing
so near the plaintiff's horse as to frighten it to death, and that the
measure of damages should be the value of the horse.
The defendant contends that the property owner does not own all
the space above his land. and that the air is free for navigation.
We must accept the defendant's contentions with some modifications.
It is true that a landowner has not the right to prevent the passage
or recover damages for the passage at a reasonable altitude, of fowls,
smoke or balloons over his land.
But what is a reasonable altitude is difficult to determine, and if a
definite line be drawn it must be drawn according to the circumstances
of the case.
In the case at bar it is admitted that the defendant intentionally
flew within three (3) feet of plaintiff's horse, and the general rule of
law is that "a person is answerable in damages for the consequences
of his fault so far as they are natural and proximate and, therefore,
may have been foreseen by ordinary forecast." Piollet et al v. Sim-
mers, 106 Pa. 95.
We think that a flying machine when brought suificiently close to a
horse is capable of frightening it to death.
Altho a defendant may be negligent in the performance of some
duty to the person injured, no liability attaches unless such negligent
act was the proximate cause of the injury. Marsh v. Giles, 211 Pa. 17.
But in the case at bar it was proven by reputable veterinarians that
the death of the horse was due to fright caused by the act of Young,
that act being the proximate cause of the death of the horse.
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Piollet v. Simmers, cited above, held that veterinarians would ba
competent persons to give their opinion based on facts as to whether
certain objects were calculated to frighten horses to death.
To constitute proximate cause creating liability for negligence the
injury must have been the natural and probable consequence of the
negligent act, altho it is not necessary, however, that injury should be
the usual necessary or inevitable result of the negligence. Burk v.
Creamery Package Mfg. Co., 126 Iowa 730; Brown Stone Co. v. Chat-
tahoochee Lumber Co., 121 Ga. 809.
"That certain phenomena will produce fear in a horse, other brute
or man the courts do not deny. That this fright may induce unreason-
ing, precipitate muscular movements in horse or man is well known,
that these movements may issue in injury to the body of horses or man,
or injury to vehicles or other property is also well known. If a horse
sees an object and takes fright resulting in damage, the person who
negligently permitted the exposure of the object is responsible not for
the horse's fright possibly, but for the result of that fright." 14Forum112.
The injury whether to person or property may be connected with
the act of the person who exposes the alarming object thru the nexus of
the fear. The contention would not be tolerated, that fear cannot be a
cause of sudden violent and uncalculated muscular movements, whether
of man or animal, and that the human cause of the fear cannot be made
responsible for the consequences of his act or omission, altho mediated
by fear. 29 cyc. 503. 14 Forum 170.
Numerous cases hold that mere fright alone, unaccompanied by bod-
ily injury, is not a cause of action, for, if it was, it would prepare the
way for many unjust claims and cause great fraud, but we think this
rule can not be applied to a horse, as it has not yet acquired the mental
equipment whereby it can arrange with its owner to frighten badly on
a particular occasion. In support of this statement we cite 14 Forum
168, which held that "one could recover for the psychological deterior-
ation of a horse due to fright."
"An action will lie for physical injury or disease resulting from
fright or nervous shock, caused by negligent acts, when defendant
should have known that such acts, would, with reasonable certainty,
cause such results, or the negligence was so gross, showing utter dis-
regard to the consequences which should have been contemplated by
him." Watkins v. Xoolin Mfg. Co., 60 L. R. A. 617.
In 111 Iowa 572, it was held that plaintiff could recover where defend-
ant removed a cover from his (defendant's) wagon, thereby frightening
plaintiff's horse and injuring her, tho there was no physical impact.
In Conklin v. Thompson, 29 Barb (N. Y.) 218, a case directly in point
with the one at bar, held that where Defendant wilfully and without a
license exploded firecrackers in a public street intending to frighten
plaintiff's horse and it was frightened and died immediately; a verdict,
for plaintiff was sustained on appeal.
While aviators have the right to navigate the air at proper heights,
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they should do sounder the condition that for injuries to property
or person on the surface of the earth, they should be liable to make
compensation, whether they have acted skillfully or carefully or not.
14 Forum 260.
In the present case Young, the aviator, "intentionally" flew three
feet above the plaintiff's horse. We think that this is not a reason-
able altitude for safety and judgment is entered in favor of plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
In determining in any case whether a defendant has incurred
liability in tort to the plaintiff, the following three questions must be
considered: (1) was the harm which the plaintiff suffered one of the
8pecified kinds of harm from which the plaintiff has the right by law to
be free; (2) was the conduct of defendant the cause, in a legal sense, of
this harm; (3) were there any circumstances or conditions in the particu-
lar case which excused or justified the infliction of the harm by the de-
fendant upon the plaintiff.
The harm in this case was the killing of the plaintiff's horse by fright
unaccompanied by phsyical contact. That this is one of the specified
kinds of harm from which the plaintiff has the right to be free was de-
cided by this court in Beck v. Harriman, 14 D. L. R. 168. It was there
held that the doctrine prevailing in Pennsylvania as to liability for the
results of anthropic fear should not be extended to hippic fear, and that
it would be absolutely indefensible to decline compensation for all the
consequences of negligence, mediated thro the fear of a horse, in sub-
mission to the foolish principle that physic causes and effects cannot
become a ground of liability. See also Piollett v. Simmers, 106 Pa. 95.
There is no doubt under the facts of this case that it was the de-
fendant's conduct .which actually caused the terror which resulted
in the death of the horse, but it is argued that, tho the defend-
ant's conduct may have been the cause as matter of fact, it is too remote
to be considered the cause in law. In this contention we cannot concur.
That a horse may become and usually does become frightened at the
sight of unusual objects is a matter of common knowledge, and that
this fright may result in the death of the horse is a physiological fact
which is equally well established and which it would be absurd for
courts to deny. If it is true as a matter of fact that the defendant's
conduct caused the death of the horse, there would seem to be no just
reason why the defendant's conduct should not be considered the legal
cause of such death.
The defendant can allege no circumstance of justification or excuse,
unless it is the law that an aviator has the unqualified right to fly over
the land of another, without liability for any damage he may cause,
if such damage is not the result of physical contact with the land or the
property of persons thereon. This doctrine has never been asserted by
any court. It is now generally conceded that aviators have the right
to navigate the air at proper heights, but it is the prevailing opinion
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that this right has brought with it a concomitant responsibility which
renders the aviators liable for injuries caused to persons or property on
the surface of the laud, whether the aviators acted with negligence or
not. Kuhn on the Beginnings of Aerial Law. American Journal of
International Law, vol. IV, p. 109; Seligman v. Thorpe, 14 D. L. R. 2S6.
In David on Motor Vehicles, p. 297, it is said: "The height at which an
aviator may lawfully pass over property must vary according to the
circumstances of the case. The criterion is the degree of peril or in-
convenience to which the proprietor is subjected. * * Flying so low
as to cause fright to domestic animals doubtless renders the aviator
liable for whatever damage may result."
In the present case the defendant was manoeuvering over the plain-
tiff's land and under the authorities this adds a strengthening element
to the plaintiff's case. "The moment an aviator ceases to be a passer-
by, he risks becoming a wrong-doer. He may occupy anothers' space
temporarily, but he must not do so longer than is reasonably necessary
for passage. The law recognizes and concedes the rights of passage,
but it does not permit any increase in the risk by reason of a stoppage,
hovering or the like. Such acts amount to a nuisance per se." David
on Motor Vehicles, p. 296. The same principle has been announced by
Pollock in regard to balloonists. Pollock on Torts, p. 348. Judgment
affirmed.
DAY v. HAYWARD
Principal and Agent-Ratification
STATEME4NT OF FACTS
Day sold goods to one Spencer, but he understood at the time that
Spencer had Hayward in mind as the ultimate consumer. Spencer
took the goods to Hayward, who accepted them, and agreed to pay
Spencer what hq was to pay Day, and a commission of 10% for his
trouble. Day claims that Hayward ratified Spencer's contract and that
he should pay him directly, Spencer having absconded.
Pearlman for Plaintiff.
Rowley for Defendant.
OPINION OF THX COURT
SINGERMAN, J.-The question involved in this case is: Did the
relationship of principal and agent exist between Spencer and Hay-
ward? Was Spencer acting as the agent of Hayward? Or, did Spencer
buy the goods from Day on his own contract, and subsequently under a
new contract, sell them to Hayward? If Spencer was acting as the
agent of Hayward, then Hayward is liable as his principal. But if
these are two distinct contracts, then Hayward cannot be held in this
action.
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.Evans, on "Principal and Agent," defines an agent as a "person
duly authorized to act on behalf of another, or one whose unauthorized
act has been duly ratified." "The relation of agent is normally con-
tractual, since it generally arises from a contract, either express or im-
plied, previously entered into between the principal and agent." (31
Cyc. 1190.) There is nothing in the facts to give rise to the presump-
tion that a contractual relation, express or implied, existed between
Spencer and Hayward, whereby the former was authorized to fix a
liability upon the latter. Spencer took the goods he had purchased
from Day to Hayward, and Hayward accepted them, not ratifying
Spencer's contract with Day, and agreeing to pay Day, but agreeing to
pay Spencer what Spencer had paid Day, and a commission of 10%.
An entirely separate and distinct contract was made with Hayward.
From the very facts of the case, it was understood that Spencer, and
he only, was to be liable to Day on his contract.
Can it be said that when A, a wholesaler, sells goods to B, a re-
tailer, but A knows that B is not the ultimate consumer, but the general
public are to purchase the goods and are the ultimate consumers, that
A can then sue one of B's vendees in case of default of B ? It is very
apparent that he could not.
The next question is one of ratification. A ratification is an agree-
ment to adopt an act performed by another for us. * * * Ratification of
a contract implies an existing person on whose behalf the contract
might have been made at the time. There cannot, in law, be a ratifi-
cation of a contract which could not have been made binding on the
ratifier at the time it was made, because the ratifier was not then in
existence. (Bouvier's Law Dictionary.) At the time Spencer made
the contract with Day, Day was not led to believe, nor was he war-
ranted in presuming, that the contract was made in behalf of Hay-
ward. The fact that he thought Spencer had Hayward in mind as the
ultimate consumer is immaterial. The vendee is not bound to know
what the vendor has in mind. When a vendor sells goods to a vendee,
the presumption is that the vendee is acting on his own behalf, and not
as the agent of another, until the contrary is shown.
The case of Pittsburg and Steubenville R. R. Co. v. Gazzam, 32 Pa.
340, cited by counsel for defendant, fully covers the question of ratifi-
cation.
A ratification, by a principal of the unauthorized acts of an agent,
in order to be effectual, must be made with a knowledge on the part of
the principal of all the material facts. (Merrick Thread Co. v. Phila.
Shoe Mfg. Co., 115 Pa. 314.)
The law, as stated, will certainly work a hardship upon Day. It
will enable Hayward to secure the goods for nothing, because his ven-
dor has absconded, and Day could only sue Spencer. But the law does
not always do justice to both sides.
Therefore, I find that there was no relationship of principal and
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agent, between Spencer and Hayward, and there was no ratification by
Hayward of Spencer's contract.
Judgment in. favor of defendant.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
The only ground which has been suggested upon which a recovery
by the plaintiff could be allowed is that of ratification. The whole
doctrine of ratification is anomalous and it should not be extended be-
yond the limits defined by the existing authorities.
In the present case, tho Day may have understood that Spencer
had Hayward in mind as the ultimate purchaser, it does not appear
that Spencer professed to act in the name of, or on behalf of, Hayward.
It follows that there can be no ratification.
The great weight of authority supports the view that in order that
a person may ratify the act of another, the act must have been done
.professedly, in the name of, and behalf of, the one so ratifying. In
Mitchell v. Minnesota Asso., 48 Minn. 278, it is said: "The law is that
where the party acting has no authority to act for the third party, and
does not profess at the time to act for him, the subsequent assent of such
party, to be bound as principal, has no operation. A ratification is only
effectual when the act is done by a person professedly acting as the
agent of the party sought to be charged as principal."
The following cases are direct adjudications applying the rule thus
stated: In Re Roanoke Co., 166 Fed. 944; Ballock v. Hooper, 6 Mackey
421; Schlessinger v. Co. (N. J.), 76 Atl. 1024; Moore v. Roper, 35 Can.
S. C. 533; Hamlin v. Sears, 82 N. Y. 327; Western Pub. House v. Rock,
84 Iowa 106. Statements to the same effect -are found in Puget Co. v.
Krug, 89 Cal. 237; Ilfeld v. Ziegler, 40 Colo. 401; Herd v. Bank, 66 Mo.
App. 643; Mender Co. v. Brustuen (S. D.), 127 N. W. 546.
In a recent case before the House of Lords of Fngland, in which
this doctrine was applied, Lord Robertson said: "The whole hypothesis
of ratification is that the ultimate ratifier is already in appearance the
contractor, and that by ratiflying he holds as done for him what already
bore, purported or professed to be done for him. There can be no room
for ratification until the credit of another than the agent has been
pledged to the third party." Keighlly v. Durant (1901), A. C. 240.
In Matheson v. Kilburn, 1 Eng. Rul. Cas. 398, it appeared that a
person intending to buy on behalf of another, but without authority
from him, and without avowing that he was acting for another person,
bought goods in his own name. The majority of the court were of the
opinion that the contract was incapable of ratification by the person
for whom the buyer intended to buy, as the latter did not assume to
buy on behalf of another person.
Judgment affirmed.
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MARY DUDLEY v. STONE
Tort-Proximate Cause-Act done under Influence of Pressing
Danger-Act April 26, 1855
STATEMENT OF FACTS
One Carter had threatened to kill Stone on sight. The husband
of plaintiff was with Stone when Carter approached. Stone upon see-
ing Carter jumped behind Dudley and held him in front of him. Carter
fired and killed Dudley. Stone then fired and killed Carter. Carter left
nothing. Stone is rich. Trespass for $10,000 damages.
Sasscer for Plaintiff.
Renard for Defendant.
OPINION OF THZ COURT
GOODING, .- Before considering the main point of contention, it
is necessary to determine whether or not Mrs. Dudley has a right of
action.
The act of April 26, 1855, provides that the persons entitled to re-
cover for any injury causing death shall be the husband, widow, chil-
dren, etc. Thus it is found that Mrs. Dudley has the legal capacity to
sue, and her right to recover is the same as would have been her hus-
band's had he survived the shot.
The fact that Stone was rich and Carter poor does not enter into
this case, since a man is entitled to no legal discrimination, because he
is rich or poor, except in the determination of damages ivhich he may
be made to pay.
Then the main question is, "Was the act of Stone in seizing and
holding Dudley before him the proximate cause of Dudley's death." No
satisfactory and absolute rule as to the determination of proximate
cause has ever been laid down by the courts, and much must therefore
depend upon the circumstances of the particular case. 64 Me. 51,
Cooley en Torts, 68-80. Another very sound and reasonable theory is
that the injury must be the natural and probable consequence of the
act complained of, and such a consequence as might and should be fore-
seen from the surrounding circumstances. Hoag v. R. R., 85 Pa. 293;
Pass. Ry. Co. v. Treteb, 117 Pa. 390; R. R. Co. v. Kellog, 94 U. S. 475.
Applying these principles, Stone could and did foresee that his
jumping behind Dudley and holding him would result in Dudley's in-
jury. This is imputably the very reason he acted in such a manner.
His first thought was to protect himself, and by placing Dudley in such
a position as to intercept Carter's bullet fired at him (Stone), Dudley's
injury would result in his own protection.
Without the operation of Stone's act, Dudley would have been un-
touched. This is an indication, but not an absolute rule in determining
what is proximate cause. Ring v. City of Cohoes, 77 N. Y. 83; Taylor
v. City of Yonkers, 105 N. Y. 202.
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The counsel for the defendant has laid great stress for his defense
upon the case of Laidlaw v. Sage, 158 N. Y. 73. But that case differs
from the one at bar in two vitally important particulars. First, the
action of Sage was not the proximate cause of the injury. Had he
moved the plaintiff in the opposite way to which he did the result would
have been the same, or had he not moved him at all. The force and de-
structive power of the dynamite reached every corner of the room, and
in this case the dangerous area was the space occupied by a man's
body in a line with the barrel of the revolver. Thus the action of Sage,
if he did move Laidlaw, contributed in no measure to the injury, while
in the case at bar without Stone's overt restraint, no damage would
have resulted to Dudley. The second distinction, which we find is that
by the plaintiff's own testimony his movement was voluntary and no
force was administered by Sage. Can it possibly be found that Dudley
stood in the line of fire of his own free will and accord? Decidedly
not. In fact the circumstances reveal an absolute negation of such a
supposition.
Proximate cause is the cause which necessarily sets the other causes
in operation. When the cause nearest to the disaster is the one which
makes fatal any or all causes, that is when the causes are dependent
one upon the other, the cause nearest the injury is the proximate cause.
Insurance Co. v. Boon, 95 U. S. 130.
In application of this principle, Stone's knowledge of Carter's in-
tent to kill him caused him to seize and hold Dudley. As far as this
case is concerned we may consider Carter's intention and ability to kill
as identical with his killing. Thus the two causes, namely, Carter's
shot and Stone's seizure and holding of Dudley are inseparably linked
together by Stone's knowledge of Carter's hatred and animosity.
We do not consider it necessary to discuss the principle in Aiken v.
P. R. R. Co., 130 Pa. 380, and P. R. R. Co. v. Werner, 89 Pa. 59, that
under pressing danger a man's actions are involuntary. Stone's danger
was not pressing. The facts tell us that he merely saw Carter ap-
proaching. He was armed and was not, as the counsel for defendant
says, "unprepared." This is shown by the fact that he, immediately
after Dudley's death, shot and killed Carter. His danger was only such
as existed between the two armed enemies, and there is no evidence
that Carter was a better marksman than Stone.
Stone is rich. He is amply able to pay to Mrs. Dudley the $10,000
which she asks, to support her in the absence of the means of living, of
which his act deprived her, and the defense has not questioned the fair-
,ness of the amount.
Judgment entered in favor of plaintiff for $10,000.
OPINION OF SUPFERIOR COURT
The act of 1851, upon which the plaintiff relies, provides in substance
that a widow shall be e4titled to recover damages where the death of
her husband was occasioned by the unlawful violence of another.
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To entitle the plaintiff in the present action to recover, it must
therefore appear (1) that the defendant's act constituted unlawful vio-
lence and (2) that this unlawful violence occasioned the death of the
plaintiff's husband.
The acts of the defendant present all the elements of a battery and
of a false imprisonment and therefore constitute unlawful violence, un-
less it is true, as contended by counsel for the defendant, that when a
person is suddenly and unexpectedly confronted by a terrible and im-
pending danger, the law presumes that an act done under the influence
of the danger is involuntary and holds any harm which this act causes
accidental, for which the actor is therefore not responsible.
The doctrine asserted by the learned counsel is thus stated in
Moak's Underhill on Torts, p. 14. "The law presumes that an act
done under the influence of pressing danger was done involuntarily."
It is said by the same author that this rule is founded upon the max-
im that self-preservation is the first law of nature, and where it is a
question whether one of two men shall suffer, each is justified in doing
the best he can for himself. The Court of Appeals of New York has
said that this principle "has been many times affirmed by the courts of
this State as well as others." Laidlaw v. Sage, 158 N. Y. 73; 44 L. R. A.,
216. Unfortunately the court did not indicate the decisions in which
the principle "has been many times affirmed."
It is certainly not true as a universal principle of either the crim-
inal or the civil law that where it is a question whether one of two in-
nocent men shall suffer each is justified in doing the best he can for
himself.
The criminal law holds that killing an innocent man cannot be jus-
tified or excused on the ground that it was done under threats by third
persons in order to save the slayer's life. Rizzole v. C., .126 Pa. 54;
21 Cyc. 833. And it has been held that a man, who in order to escape
death from starvation, kills another for the purpose of eating his flesh,
is guilty of murder, altho at the time of the act he is in such circum-
stances that he believes and has reasonable grounds for believing that
it affords the only chance of saving his life. Reg. v. Dudley, 15 Cox
624.
By the civil courts it has been held that a man who under threats
of death trespasses upon the lands of another is liable therefor, "be-
cause one cannot justify a trespass upon another for fear." Gilbert v.
Stone, Aleyn 35. And in the famous case of Scott v. Shepherd, Black-
stone, J., stated that Ryal, upon whose stand the squib had been thrown
and who, acting not as "a free agent," but under a "compulsive neces-
sity for his own safety and self-preservation," instantly picked it up and
threw it to another part of the market house so that it struck Scott, was
liable to Scott, because "not even menaces from others are sufficient to
justify a trespass against a third person; much less fear of danger to
either his goods or his person.
The question presented is whether a man is liable for an injury in-
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flicted upon an innocent stranger, knowingly or with sufficient notice
of the danger, if the injury is an unavoidable incident of self-protec-
tion. Answering this question it has been said, and held, that when it
is a question of paying damages, a man cannot shift his misfortunes
to his neighbor's shoulders. Cooley on Torts, 115; Spade v. R. R., 172
Mass. 448.
In Miller v. Horton, 152 Mass. 547, it is said: "It could not be as-
sumed as a general principle, without discussion, that even necessity
would exonerate from civil liability for a loss knowingly inflected upon
an innocent person who neither by his person nor property threatens
any wrong to the defendant. It has been thought by great lawyers
that a man cannot shift his misfortunes upon his neighbor's shoulders."
The principle enunciated by these "great lawyers" may not be ap-
plicable to cases where the act of the defendant furthered a common in-
terest of the parties or where it served a public purpose, but we think
that it is, and should be, applicable to the present case.
Assuming that the act of the defendant in holding the plaintiff's
husband was unlawful violence, the question whether this violence "oc-
casioned" the death of the plaintiff's husband remains to be answered.
The learned counsel for the defendant claims that Stone's act was
not the proximate cause of Dudley's death, because between Stone's
act and the injurious consequence there intervened an act produced by
the volition of a third person.
It is not, however, true that the mere circumstance that there in-
tervened between the wrongful act and the injurious consequences acts
produced by the volition of third person renders the result so remote
that no action can be maintained.
Where the intervention of the independent agency might have been
reasonably anticipated the causal connection is not broken and the
original wrong doer is liable for the injury sustained. 29 Cyc. 501.
Judgment affirmed.
ESTATE OF JOHN MARSHALL
Specific Legacy-Adempiion of Specific Legacy
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Marshall wrote a will in which he bequeathed to his son Henry his
40 shares of the stock of the X. R. R. Co. Subsequently that company
merged with the t. R. R. Co., the combined company being the Z. Co.,
and shares in company formed by the merger, viz., the Z. Co., were
issued on surrender of shares in X. and Y. Cos. Marshall died and Henry
claims the 40 shares of the Z. Co.
Young for Plaintiff.
Durkin for Defendant.
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW 55
OPINION OF THE COURT
McCALL4 , J.-The facts set forth above show that the legacy in
question is specific. A specific legacy is defined to be a gift by will of
a specific article or part of testator's estate which is identified and dis-
tinguished from all other things of same kind and which may be satis-
fied only by delivery of particular thing. 18 Am. & Eng., Encyc., 714;
Stover's Est., 45 Sup. 451; Snyder's Est., 217 Pa. 71.
The question to be decided then is whether the facts set forth con-
stitute an ademption of this legacy. Counsel agree that testator in his
lifetime exchanged the stock.
The old idea that the testator's intention was to be considered has
been exploded. Gibson, in Blackstone v. Blackstone, 3 Watts 335, says:
"The annihilation of a specific legacy, or such changes in its estate, as
makes it another thing, annuls bequest for reasons paramount to con-
siderations of intention."
In Walton v. Walton, 7 Johnson Ch. (N. Y.) 258, it is said, "An
ademption is affected on principle that the thing is annihilated or its
condition so altered that nothing remains to which the terms of bequest
can apply." In Hoke v. Herman, 21 Pa., 301, it is said: "Unless the
very thing bequeathed is in existence at death of testator, and then
forms a part of his estate, the legacy is wholly inoperative; the legatee
has no right or claim; the executors are under no obligations to replace
the thing by purchasing another one of same kind as described in the
will by means of other assets in their hands belonging to estate." See
Ludlow's Est., 13 Pa. 188.
Gibson, J., in Blackstone v. Blackstone, Supra., says: "A legacy
properly specific, and not merely specific in its nature by being charged
on a specific fund, is adeemed by any change of its state or form, ef-
fected, not by fraud or operation of law, but by act of testator, whatever*
be its purpose, which makes the corpus of legacy at his death a different
thing than what is indicated by terms of description." In Thayer v.
Paulding (Mass.), 85 N. E. 868, it is said: "A specific legacy of a desig-
nated number of shares of corporate stock owned by testator at the time
of execution of his will, is adeemed on testator disposing of same in his
lifetime or on property ceasing to exist."
Pope v. Hinckley (Mass.), 95 N. E. 798, is relied on by plaintiff.
In that case the exchange of stock was not made by testator in his life-
time. The corporation whose shares he devised in his will, was a New
Jersey Corporation operating in Connecticut, and had passed into hands
of receivers, and testator had merely deposited his shares in a trust com-
pany which issued negotiable voting trust certificates. This was the
state of affairs when testator died. After his death, trust certificates
were exchanged for stock in the new corporation which was organized
in Connecticut. Depositing the stock in the trust company was but one
step toward the transmutation of stock in the old company into that of
the new. If the scheme failed, the old stock was to be returned to the
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stockholders. The court then decides the legacies were not specific, and
of course the legatees took the stock in the new company. (Thayer v.
Paulding was relied upon in this case.)
Gardner v. Gardner (N. H.), 56 Atl. 316, is also relied upon by the
plaintiff. Testatrix after bequeathing 75 shares of stock, traded these
in for 75 shares of stock in a corporation formed by a merger of the old
corporation and another. She subsequently sold 25 shares. The court
decided that the remaining 50 shares were subject to the specific devise.
But counsel in this case agreed that it was the intention that the shares
of the second corporation be substituted for those of the first. Hence
this case decides that a specific legacy is liable to abate by testator dis-
posing of part of devised property. Snyder's Est., 217 Pa. 71, is similar
to this case in that the intention of the testator was shown dehors the
will.
In re Pierce, 25 R. I. 34, 54 Atl. 588, is very similar to the case at
bar. Testatrix bequeathed certain stock in a bank. Subsequently, but
during her lifetime, this bank consolidated with other banks. The new
concern taking over the liabilities and assets of several banks without
a formal liquidation, and their stockholders being entitled to exchange
their shares for stock in the consolidated bank. Testatrix did so, making
a small additional payment in cash.
HELD.-That as transfer was not a sale, but an exchange, there was
no ademption of the legacy. This was a per curiam opinion and only
one case was cited in it and access cannot be had to examine it. But
the court seems to imply that had this been a sale, the legacy would have
been adeemed.
"A sale or exchange is a transmutation of property from one man to
another in consideration of some price or recompense in value." "But
with regard to the LAW of sales and exchange, there is no difference."
2 Black, 446, 447; Tiffany on sales, 12, and cases therein cited. The only
comment I make on this case is that it is basedon avery refined distinction,
and that the weight of authority is the other way, both in Pennsylvania
and in the other states. Powers Est., 222 Pa. 179; Black's E1st., 223 Pa.
382; Snyder's Bst., 217 Pa. 71.
Many more cases may be found on this subject in a note to Snyder's
t4st. (Supra.), in 11 L. R. A. N. S., 63.
Although the courts do not favor specific legacies, and the working
of the law of ademption works hardships as in the case at bar, yet the
precedents must be followed regardless of one's personal opinion of what
the law ought to be.
It is decided.-
(1) The legacy was specific.
(2) The legacy was adeemed by the testator's exchange of the
stock before his death.
Judgment for defendant.
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OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
It is well established that a legacy of a stated number of shares of
stock of a designated oorporation without further explanation and with-
out more particularly referring to and identifying the shares intended
to be bequeathed is general and not specific. 18 A. & F., Encyc., 718;
10 Annotated Cas., 492. In Sponsler's Appeal, 107 Pa. 95, a legacy of
"fifteen shares of second preferred C. V. R. R. stock" was held to be a
general legacy. See also Lathrop's Estate, 3 D. R. 100; Snyder's Est.,
217 Pa. 71, 11 L. R. A. N. S. 53.
According to the great weight of authority, the ownership by the
testator of the exact number of shares bequeathed does not make the
legacy specific, Sponsler's Appeal, 107 Pa. 95; 18 A. & E., Encyc. 718.
"A legacy of stock even tho the number of shares is an odd one, corre-
sponding exactly to the number owned by the testator, and tho the stock
itself is not generally found on the market, is not specific." Yerkes
Est., 8 D. R. 84. "A legacy of stock, of whatever denomination, is not
prima facie specific, altho the testator may have had stock of the de-
scription mentioned, sufficient to answer the bequest." Snyder's Est.,
217 Pa. 71.
Where, however, the testator describes the stock bequeathed as his,
the legacy is specific. 18 A. & Z., 719; 10 Annotated Cas., 494; Alspoop's
Ap., 9 Pa. 375; Ludlow's Est., 13 Pa. 188; Blackstone v. Blackstone, 3
Watts 335; Klenke's Est., 210 Pa. 575. "It is certainly true that the
presumption of intention is favorable to general legacies, and that it
requires clear proofs of a restrictive intention to repel it; but the word
"my" prefixed to the word stock, has always been held sufficient of it-
self to do so." Snyder's Appeal, 217 Pa. 71. The legacy under exam-
ination in the present case was therefore specific.
The learned court below has correctly decided that the legacy was
adeemed. There was an absolute annihilation or extinction of the in-
terests of the X. R. R. Co., and compensation was awardedin the shape
of an allotment of different stock, in a different concern, on an entirely
different footing. In a recent well considered case, decided by the Court
of Appeal of England, it is held that a specific legacy of stock in a cor-
poration is adeemed where, after the execution of the will, the testator
exchanges the stock for stock in a corporation which has succeeded to
the rights and property of the first corporation. Slater v. Slater (1907),
1 Ch. 665. The court said, "It seems to me, upon a consideration of the
authorities that, having regard to the facts of this case, there is an ex-
tinction or annihilation of the original property, which has put an end
to it, and that this other stock which is taken for it, cannot be treated
as substituted for it in such a sense as is to be found in some of the cases
which have been referred to, where a change in stock not in substance,
but in form, has been held not to change its identity."
Judgment affirmed.
